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THE RELATION BETWEEN FORM AND 
PROCESS 
GEORGE P. ADAMS 
I propose to consider certain aspects of the relation between 
any principle of orgap.ization and the ,material or content to 
which the principle is applied. The duality of form and matter 
received explicit recognition in European philosophy before 
men did their thinking in terms of the contrast between sub-
jective and objective, or between mind and body. And to what-
ever degree this earlier dualism may have been overshadowed 
by the predominant status which these later contrasts have 
acquired, this more primitive duality has persisted. It is, I 
believe, of primordial importance and inescapable. The thesis 
of my paper may be stated at the outset. Experience discloses 
active forms organizing material. This transpires in various 
ways and at different levels. It is my belief that this relation 
is more complex than appears at first sight. A principle which 
is applied to matter or stuff in order to organize it, categorize 
it, interpret it, may also express the nature of the material 
which is thus organized. The matter to which a form or cate-
gory is applied may also be a process which generates and 
which finds utterance in the very form which is used to organize 
it. This is why the title of my paper is the relation between 
'' form and process.'' But throughout the earlier part of the 
paper, the simpler relations between form and material will be 
before us. It is because this relation and the framework of life 
and of thought which it connotes, issue in certain difficulties, 
that we shall be led to enquire whether it can be supplemented 
192 University of California Piiblications [PruLosoPay 
by another type of relation. The relation of organizing is at the 
same time the relation of expressing. If this is granted in prin-
ciple, there are important consequences for metaphysics, most 
of which will have to be drawn by my readers and not at this 
time by myself. 
That there are alternative and competitive schemata or pat-
~erns, forms or perspectives into which some matter or stuff of 
experience can be pressed, has been the theme of several of the 
preceding papers. Mr. Mackay exhibited the historical back-
ground of two such fundamental, categorial schemes. One is 
the subject-pr~§_icate, substance-quality relation. The other is 
the broader type of relational structure as such, of reciprocal 
and functional relations such as those which interest modern 
science, lying in one plane and with no privileged status accorded 
to substance or subject. Mr. Loewenberg depicted three differ-
ent perspectives, generated by specific types of the relation of 
priority, into each of which the entire stuff of experience can 
be thrown withot1t remainder. Each of these perspectives forms 
a closed circle, each is autonomous, exhaustive, .and exclusive 
of the other two. The philosopher is the fortunate possessor of 
three estates each of which is self-sustaining and complete. He 
may wander from one to the other at will, and his choice of a 
fixed abode depends upon nothing but his own caprice. Each 
ot the three estates, however, fenced in as it is by its own defin-
ing type of priority, arouses a feeling of restlessness, and a 
longing for the free uncramped s:r,iaces of cosmic substance. In 
these cosmic stretches there are no fences made by us-but like-
wise there are no tracks, either, such as we can follow. For we 
can only tread the paths that we ourselves have made. 
For Mr. Pepper, each philosophical estate, each metaphysical 
structure, is hewn out of material all of which is taken from the 
cosmic quarry, from stuff. But, as I understand him; the archi-
tect's plan, the scheme of paths and fences, the categorial, 
defining form, of the estate is likewise taken from the cosmic 
quarry. The fragment of stuff seized upon by the philosopher 
becomes a 'root metaphor.' It is magically transmitted into a 
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category, an organizing scheme, which is· then applied to the 
whole of stuff. But because it is only a fragment of stuff it is 
not adequate to the whole of st~, so that every metaphysical 
structure has its owri. characte;ristic type of inadequacy, its own 
way of misstating the nature of stuff. Yet no metaphysical 
edifice is entirely arbitrary, that i13 erected in accordance with 
some plan originating in an architect's mind aloof from and 
transcendent to the material which he has to use. 
-These are crass and gross metaphors. Yet they reflect and 
suggest a primordial root metaphor which appears all but 
inescapable in one mode .or another, and which has even played 
a determining role in philosophical reflection .. That primordial, 
root metaphor is the discernment of the distinction between any 
form, pattern, scheme, or principle, and any material or stuff 
which is comprised within form, or that something, whatever it 
is, to which form is applicable. Preoccupation with form is 
indeed one of the signal characteristics of human life and expe-
rience. .A. delight in patterns and rhythms, in ordered schemata 
of stimuli and responses because of the formal relationships 
which they display, is woven into all of the utilitarian and prac-
tical arts whereby primitive man wrests a precarious existence 
from the resources which his environment offers him.· The dom-
inance of custom and taboo, of ritual and art serv-es but to 
illustrate the manner in whlch every response to a here and 
n9w particular: situation is modified and constrained by some 
encompassing form whose sweep and whose control transcend 
that of the immediate occasion eliciting behavior. 
This impelling, even. if inchoate and but half-conscious 
sense for form which primitive culture displays, lies midway 
between .those relatively rigid responses of the higher animals 
to stimuli which are called 'instinctive,' and the reflective, 
explicit discovery of form as such which was the outstanding 
achievement of Greek science and philosophy. The belief that 
there is some primordial principle, arche, or physis which can be 
disentangled from the flux and variety of things as experienced, 
and the successive descriptions of such form_ or forms, provides 
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the theme of Greek philosophy from Thales to Aristotle. Forms 
and patterns which for primitive man are inextricably fused 
with the concrete and particular situation of his practical life 
' are now sought out for their own sake ; they acquire thereby a 
metaphysical, Olympian, and cosmic status, a lordly sovereignty 
and independence. Their humble and demo-cratfo origin is soon 
forgotten and ignored. They appear in our midst as· strangers 
from another world, haunting reminders or dim foreshadowings 
of a transcendent and timeless realm, an objective world of 
Pure Form, untrammeled with the trappings of sense and matter, 
process- and change. Man's discovery and recognition of such 
transcendent forms and ·of the remote world in which they were 
thought to dwell soon appeared, however, as too stupendous an 
achievement to be explained by any poor powers native to man's 
intrinsic nature. This standing miracle of his life and expe-
rience, that a creature of time should apprehend the timeless, 
that a world of pure form should be disclosed to a creature of 
sense; how could this be unless pure Form itself ceased to be 
m·erely objective, awaiting man's discovery, unless Form clothed 
and revealed itself. in homely,· human, and comprehensible 
shape, unless the Word became :flesh and dwelt among us. In 
thus entering into the very texture of experience, in thus relin-
quishing their solitary.habitat beyond the confines of sense and 
time, forms come to play a different role. It is now for them to . 
transf arm and refashion the crude stuff of human nature and 
experience. They now provide the active, organizing principles 
of structures which are not given to man, ready made, but which 
are the products of his own activity. The underlying nature 
and significance of this shift from objective and transcendent 
forms awaiting disclosure to active forms whose meaning lies 
in their use as organizing and constructive principles within 
experience may be described in a variety of ways. It may be 
thought of as an expression of the historic fact that the northern 
barbarian peoples, having· been throughout the middle ag·es dis-
ciplined by objective forms which had their origin in Greek 
and Roman civilization, finally decide to malrn their own civi-
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lization. For such an attitude, there are no authoritative object-
ive forms to be merely discovered .and acknowledged. The only 
significant forms are those which· express the life and the inter-
ests of human nature, and which can be used to refashion 
everything which is given. Or we may view this shift from 
objective forms to active principles of organization, as a con-
comitant of a vigorous individualism, the recognition of active 
centers of individual experience incessantly engaged in exploit-
ing th~ material which the world offers in the interest of its 
own expanding satisfaction and· enjoyment. 
Before turning to a consideration of this relation between 
form and matter, between principles of org·anization and what-
ever content may be subjected to them, I want to• consider the 
circumstances which facilitate the discrimination between them. 
We may here discern the operation of a principle which has a 
wide range of application. 
Any discrimination between different parts or aspects of 
things experienced depends upon the fact that any specific item 
is not always found in the same context. It meets us with 
varying . and different associates. This characteristic of our 
experience which so greatly · facilitates discrimination was 
spoken of by James as '' the law of dissociation by varying con-
comitants." It is the principle that "what is associated now 
with one thing and now with another tends to become disso-
ciated from either and to grow into an object of abstract con-
templation by the mind.' ,i If any element or aspect m were met 
with only along with some other aspect or' element n, and if n 
always appeared with m, and never with other associates, then 
neither m nor n would be shuffled out for special notice and dis-
crimination. Thus, the ability to discriminate appears to depend 
upon a certain looseness of structure, upon the absence of 
invariable and universal ties or relations between the parts of 
our world. 
Such looseness of structure is exemplified on a vast scale 
in processes· of change. Whenever we are aware of anything 
1 James, P'syohology, I:506. 
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as moving or changing, we are aware of some item of experience 
breaking loose from some of its associates and joining others. 
To perceive change is to perceive shifting and shuffling, such 
a rear:r,-angement of items. The bird now perched on yonder 
telegraph pole is, a moment later, on the branch of a tree. The 
ingredients of my world have become rearranged. The aware-
ness of change is the awareness of the shuffling of elements and 
aspects, which become discriminated precisely because they are 
not perennially bound to the same associates. 
This looseness of structure, of which all experienced change 
is but an instance and which makes discrimination possible, 
generates the discernment of relations as distinct from the items 
or terms which are related. James's 'law of dissociation by 
varying concomitants,' which expresses what I have called the 
world's looseness of structure, states that if I am to discriminate 
a from b or c, I must be presented first with a b c, and then with 
am n. Now we find the same relations holding between different 
sets of terms. The bird is now perched on the telegraph pole 
and later is perched on the tree branch. 'Being· perched upon' 
is the relation which appears in both instances, b{it with varying 
concomitants, i.e., with one term, the thing perched upon, dif-
ferent in the two cases. Here, too, is a looseness of structure, 
making possible the discernment of relations as such, distinct 
· from the items related. 
It should be noted that in all these cases of looseness of struc-
ture, or varying concomitants, there is present some invariant 
element or character. It is this invariant which is discriminated. 
It stands out because it has broken loose from its old associates 
and has acquired new ones .. In a world wholly kaleidoscopic, 
lacking every trace of an invariant, discrimination would hardly 
be possible. This invariant character need not perhaps be abso-
lute. It is enough if there be a relative invariancy. Discrimina-
tion would still be possible in a world every feature of ·which is 
in a state of flux as long as the rate of change is not everywhere 
the same, permitting the appearance of contrasts and of novel 
concomitants, as in a race where all the contestants are moving 
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but ·with varying distances between them. This need for the 
presence of some invariant feature, however relative, if any-
thing is to be discriminated from anything else, :is the basis, I 
believe, for the dictum that there is no change without the 
changeless. The belief in things and substances may turn out 
to be merely a formulation of the conditions of discrimination. 
The belief in the existence of space may reflect the psychological 
principle enunciated by James. Space would be the ultimate 
invariant, the background, whose foreground consists in the 
shifting, spatial forms and relations. 
Among the invariant features of our world whose discrimi-
nation has proved to be momentous are just those denoted by the 
term 'form.' The same form appears with varying concomi-
tants. The visible shape of the full moon is markedly similar 
to that of many other circular and spherical things. The dis-
cernment of visible circular shape as such is the result of noting 
the varying colors, textures, sizes which are concomitant with 
just this specific shape. And it was the visible shape of things 
which was responsible for the Greek word which has become 
almost the dominant master term in European philosophy. 
The eroos of anything is the common and essential aspect of 
contour or shape which all things visible possess, and without 
which they could not be seen. The root of the term idea, is 
found in the Latin videre, to see. 
The loosening of visible shape from its varying concomitants 
inevitably suggested a further step, that of shaking free the 
feature of form from its visible associations. The concept of 
form, of idea, becomes widened and generalized through being 
thus released from restriction to visible shape. There are tem-
poral forms such as rhythms, mathematical forms and figures 
characterizing numbers and ratios, there are forms exemplified 
in speech which were easily taken to correspond with the inar-
ticulate logos of nature. What else is knowledge but the dis-
cernment of form r Is not form the single invariant of nature, 
the One single residue which remains when its shifting concomi-
tants and associates drop out of the picture r For, once more, 
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knowledge is discernment, discrimination. Discrimination is 
possible only if some item presents itself to us with varying 
concomitants; this confers upon_ the item discerned at least a 
relative constancy contrasted with all of its shifting associates. 
What is left as the object of discernment and knowledge pa.r 
exc,ellence can be nothing but the invariant pattern or type, the 
for1;ll or idea. Early Greek philosophy went out in search of an 
invariant, and pictured that invariant as a particular kind of 
thing, such as· water or air. Meanwhile, shape, form, rhythm 
' . ' 
order were discriminated from all things and processes. In the 
metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle these two philosophical 
motives converge and fuse. Form, and form albile, is the invari-
ant and therefore the real. The two contrasts, that between the 
invariant and the shifting, between being and becoming, and 
that between pure form and the content or matter in which form 
is for the moment embodied, come to coincide. It is thus the 
· world's -looseness of structure which facilitates some one item's 
shaking' itself free from its -old concomitants and acquiring new 
ones, and this it is which ~akes discernment and_ knowledge 
possible. In a·frozen world, where all the linkages and relations 
are tight and unalterable, discrimination would be at best but 
rudimentary; specific items and their boundaries· would tend to 
merge in a flat amorphous background. 
But, clearly, we are not solely dependent upon things of 
themselves shifting their associates and hence becoming discrim-
inated. We not only observe change and becoming, which we 
have seen to be but one instance of the fluctuating concomitants 
of the world's items. We may ourselves initiate· and be respon-
sible for a,, change in an item's associates. We rearrange and 
reshuffle the entities comprising our world. We thereby enor-
mously facilitate the process of discrimination and the aware-
ness of things. Even in the absence of overt manipulation of 
things, when we sit back and look at things, we are·shuffl.ing the 
seen concomitants of whatever' we are looking at. I see the· pic-
ture on the wall'now as above the row or books, now to the· right 
of the door, and now to the left of 'the window. Only because I 
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thus see it in varying contexts can I be said to discriminate and 
see it. When I take the picture down and hold it in my hands, 
or :replace it elsewhere on the wall, I am but continuing the 
same process as that which I began to do when I let. my eyes 
eKplore its neighborhood. · I am, in short, experimenting. I am, 
on iny own initiative, changing the context, the associates and 
concomitants of some item. And so far as I can see, the experi-
mental method. of science is nothing but the refinement and 
elaboration of such artificially initiated chang·es i:ri the contexts 
of things, in the service of discrimination. The voluntary mus-
cles of the body employed in the accommodation of sense organs, 
in• seeing; touching, hearing, and tasting, are instruments for 
shifting and ·transposing the concomitants of the experienced 
<lontents of our world. That the voluntary initiation of changes 
in context and relations in the interest of discrimination and 
knowledge has enormously increased its scope and powers in 
modern 'experimental' science goes without sa.ying. I seriously 
question, however, whether it has introduced a radically novel 
factor in that process of discriminating the ingredients of our 
world,, which all observation and knowledge· depend upon. 
Experimentation, the voluntary inauguration of changes in an 
item's concomitants, is in principle present from the earliest use 
of eyes and hands. Generically, the same principle of experi-
m..entationjs operative throughout the entire range of knowledge, 
When one frames an hypothesis, one is placing an idea in some 
novel and, it .:r:µay be fruitful context. To examine a crystal in 
yarying temperatures, to subject it to different reagents, to put it 
1;1nder. a microscope or upon a scale, is to experiment. We are 
able to experime:p.t because the items of our world are not indis• 
solubly attached. ·once for all to their neighbors. We pry them 
apart and. r(;)locate them in a changed habitat. It is the loose 
~tructure of the world which makes this possible. To think, to 
fa$hio;n hypotheses; .to operate with 'ideas' instead of with 
'grings': is,uot in, principle anything radically different. What 
are called ideas• are !;limply those items in 01ir world which exem• 
plify looseness of structure to a vastly greater degree than do 
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crystals and so-called physical things. It is easier to pry 'ideas, 
away from their momentary concomitants than is the case with 
ordinary things. So· loosely indeed are they attached to their 
surroundings that most modern philosophy and psychology have 
thought it necessary to provide a wholly detached habitat for 
ideas such that only a virtual miracle can once more restore their 
context with other things. I am not saying that ideas are phys-
ical things. A physical thing, in spite of its movability and its 
possibility of forming novel associations, is far more rigidly 
linked with other things than are those items in our world 
which we call ideas, and this difference is of fundamental impor-
tance. I am saying that ideas (in the modern, not the original 
Greek sense) belong to the world even though they be those items 
in the world which can most readily be lifted from one context 
to another. 
Whenever, in short, any item is moved from one context to 
another in the interest of discrimination or knowledge, there is 
experimentation. This occurs, we have noted, in manifold ways 
and at various levels. I want now to consider a plane where such 
experimentation takes place with a very wide sweep and, as it 
were, in wholesale fashion. We not only· take ·a specific item 
such as a crystal, and place it in different contexts in order to 
shake out the discriminable nature of the crystal. We take 
whole masses of experience, of data, of stuff or matter, and 
bring them now within the scope of one large organizing prin-
ciple and now within another. Again, we may take one and the 
same organizing form and apply it now to one mass of data and 
now to another. And because the same material can be subjected 
to or comprised within different forms, and the same form can 
_be used · to organize varying masses of material, we easily come 
sharply to discriminate between forms, schemata, organizing 
principles, and the matter or stuff which is organized by them. 
This discrimination is a supreme instance of looseness of struc-
ture. It is a supreme example of James's "law of dissociation by 
varying concomitants.'' And it is we who are able, more or less 
deliberately, to effect such dissociation and mutation of con-
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comitants on a large scale.· We ,are not impressed, as were the 
Greeks, by the inevitability of a specific form, given a specific 
matter or process. Forms are not, for modern thought and 
experience, sn tightly linked to objective and cosmic material, 
that, in apprehending any thing or process, we apprehend the 
one inevitable form which is attached to that thing·. Form has 
become manifold, flexible, applicable more or less at will to such 
material as is given to us. 
I shall indicate some of the ways in which diverse forms ma,y 
be applied to the same stuff or matter, ways in which different 
organizing principles appear to compete among themselves for 
the right to dominate a mass of given contents or material. I 
notice first a series of domains or worlds which are generated 
by our major, dominant interests. There are the worlds of sci-
ence, of religion, of art, of economics, the worlds . of common 
sense, of description, of appreciation. Each of these comprises 
what Simmel has called a 'world totality.' In each of them, 
all or nearly all of the matter of our experience is organized 
and interpreted in a specific manner. A characteristic attitude 
or interest sweeps within its own defining form the given material 
of our experience. The net which each one of these basic organ-
izing principles throws out is wide and comprehensive enough 
to catch within it everything with which we meet. The inde-
pendence and autonomy of each of these defining interests arid 
the world totalities which they severally generate, constitute an 
outstanding feature of modern civilization_ as contrasted with 
medieval life. For medieval men the' worlds of knowledge, of 
art, of economic life were imbedded within the one enveloping 
world totality defined by the religious interest. We are aware 
of diverse and competing world totalities in each of which the 
given material of experience is appropriated by a dominant and 
comprehensive attitude or interest, an organizing and active 
Form. The stuff which we barely encounter may be material 
for scientific analysis and interpretation, it may become 
the object of aesthetic appreciation, it may be responded to in 
the light of a dominantly religious attitude, or it may be taken 
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up and .assimilated by· our practical, common-sense interests. 
The point is that each of these is a world totality which is the 
product of applying an active, organizing form to the raw 
material of experience .. And because the same material can be 
assini:ilated by different forms, we have become acutely aware 
of the competitive, exclusive nahire of these engrossing princi-
ples generating diverse world totalities. 
The situation is not essentially altered when we turn to a 
consideration of that one of these world totalities with which 
philosophy is chiefly concerned, i.e., the world as known, as the 
object of our theoretical interest. There is something deeply 
paradoxical in the fact that the theoretical interest is but one 
of a variety of competing interests or forms, each of which, as 
we have seen, generates its own autonomous world totality. For 
the theoretic interest is at the same time utterly catholic and 
comprehensive; it is bent upon the acquisition of insight into 
the nature of all of the worlds of experience and does not will-
ingly· permit any world or any organizing form to escape the 
net of its own· interest. How can it be but one specific organiz-
ing principle alongside of others which differ from it, and at the 
same time make good its claim literally to comprehend them all, 
to grasp the nature of those world totalities which are generated 
by other than theoretic forms? . This seems to me to be the 
problem of knowledge which actually presses upon us most 
acutely in our modern life. It is not this question, however, 
which concerns us here. 
Confining our attention to the theoretical interest, to the 
world as known:, we may observe here in this smaller domain 
the presence of competitive organizing principles.· Each specific 
type of metaphysical structure, naturalism, realism, idealism, 
rationalism, and what .not issues from the selection of some one 
dominant scheme, category, or form which is applied, in inten-
tion, to the entire material of experience. The various types of 
priority which were analyzed by Mr. Loewenberg provide an 
admirable illustration of such competitive forms, each of which 
lays claim to complete autonomy arid to a sweeping inclusive-
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ness. Each is sovereign within the domain defined by its own 
initial organizing· principle. No one of them is entitled to legis-
late for another, nor to exercise any constraint or criticism out-
side of its own specific structure. Each of these appears to gen-
erate an autonomous perspective, a sovereign metaphysical state. 
Competition and mutual jealousy characterizes these metaphys-
ical states no less than they do sovereign political states. .Any-
thing lµrn a metaphysical league would appear to threaten the 
integrity of these potentially warring philosophical structures, 
just as a league of nations seems to contradict the axiom of 
political sovereignty. 
When one turns from metaphysics to science, does one find 
anything analogous to such diversity of organizing principles 
competing for sovereignty over the same mass of material, of 
facts and data? Or is there in science but a single authoritative 
categorial scheme implicitly recognized as binding upon every 
scientific enterprise? Were this the case, the scientist ought 
never to be in any doubt as to the legitimacy of his ideas of 
explanation and intelligibility. There would be but a single 
sovereign way of winning theoretical scientific mastery over any 
body of facts. Such indeed has been and still is a common pre-
supposition of science and scientific workers. It has repeatedly 
been assumed that the only legitimate type of scientific intelli-
gibility is that of a mechanical system governed by the immediate 
contact and. push of ultimate material particles. Or, again, 
mathematical intelligibility, a deductive system of mathematical 
equations l:las often seemed the one ideal of scientific understand-
ing and intelligibility, however remote and unrealizable it may 
be in actual scientific practice. The ide_al of mechanical explana-
tion and of mathematical intelligibility point indeed in two 
different directions. The former has an eye for discrete ele-
ments, the latter for continua exemplified by space, time, and 
the arithmetical continuum. There is an analogous diversity in 
the conflict between the search for continuous processes of change 
and development, and the emphasis upon discrete intrusive 
events which are not predictable in terms of any antecedent 
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process which they invade. It cannot be said, I believe, that 
there is one single type of scientific intelligibility, one and only 
one categorial scheme which dictates the nature of any scien-
tific explanation. There are alternative forms and organizing 
principles in science no less than in: metaphysics. Various cate-
gorial schemes compete for mastery over the same material and 
µata. 
I wish to mention another region in which we are confronted 
with a similar situation. The problem of ethics has its roots in 
the existence of alternative and competitive organizing prin-
ciples of practice between which we have to choose. We call 
them ideals, or ends, dominant or root interests, comprehensive 
. plans of action, or purposes. They are in truth active forms. 
They are categories and perspecthres of practice, just as meta-
physical and scientific categories are the schemata and principles 
of theoretical comprehension. We are not interested in them 
here for their own sake. Our concern with them lies in observing 
that here, too, there is a plurality of such practical forms and 
that the necessity of some choice is thrust upon u~. There would 
be no moral problem were there only one inevitable, one single, 
indubitably authentic practical scheme of organizing· our lives 
and our civilization. If such were the case, all practical prob-
lems would be technical, i.e., they would be concerned only with 
devising means for mastering the material at our disposal in the 
service of some unquestioned end or ultimate preference which 
would not itself be subject to critical ·appraising or reflective 
comparison with other competing ends and preferences. There 
is a moral world and a moral problem precisely because the same 
material of human nature and historical processes can be prac-
tically subsumed under mutually exclusive and competitive 
practical principles. Just as there is a metaphysical problem 
only- because the total stuff of human_ experience can be subsumed 
under and theoretically organized by any one of a number of 
categorial schemes and relations. In both cases there is a kind 
of loo~eness of structure as between form and matter ; what is 
given is not indissolubly tied down to a single necessary form. 
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Neither theoretical nor practical organization of the material 
of experience is l')ubject to exclusive constraint from the side of 
the given, of 'fa.cts,' of sense data, of some merely presented 
state of affairs. .And this is why I think that any such attempt 
as that of Mr. Prall to elicit the principles and laws of thought 
solely from the characteristics of sense presentation is bound to 
fail. To assert such a thesis would be analogous to saying that 
the rules of chess are ultimately to be discerned in the spatio-
temporal, sense relatio11s of the pieces as they lie in a box or on a 
chess-board. To be sure, the rules of chess are arbitrary and 
conventional, in a sense in which the rules of the intellectual 
game of thinking are not to be thus characterized. There are 
many possible sets of rules which would define many kinds of 
games of chess, and there is only one set of rules for making 
valid inferences and implications in the game of thinking. 
Nevertheless, there is more in the game of chess than is contained 
within the material of the game. That more is the element of 
form, of principles according to which the pieces are to be 
moved. To think, to infer, is to organize the material of expe-
rience in a certain way, a way which is not exclusively ,dictated 
by the material at hand. 
Here, then, is a framework of life and thought whose perva-
sive and dominant characteristic is the contrast between active, 
organizing principles and a given alien material which is to be 
arranged and set in order. .A survey of human experience dis-
closes the operative presence of organizing forms in the guise 
of principles which generate the world totalities of science, art, 
religion, economic life, as categories which give birth to com-
peting :r;netaphysical structures, as demands and schemata which 
produce various types of scientific intelligibility and explana-
tion, and as dominant ideals of practical life, ultimate prefer-
ences and interests determining specific scales of values and 
choices. .An examination of this type of structure, wherever 
it presents itself, discloses certain typical features which I want 
to enumerate. The presence of these characteristics renders the 
resulting situation unsatisfactory and problematic. If we allow 
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our thinking to be guided solely or predominantly by this set of 
motives, we are indeed confronted by a dilemma. Either, we are 
left with a plurality of worlds, of formed and organized struc-
tures which are isolated not only from one another but from 
the stuff and material of reality, or, desirous of escaping such 
isolation, and wishing to resume the continuity between the 
various regions of experience and between experience and real-
ity, we are led to rebel against the forms and principles of 
organization which are responsible for such isolation: either a 
plurality of ordered realms, constituted by formative principles 
which are arbitrarily imposed upon a material whose nature is 
in no wa.y expressed by the form which attempts to organize it, 
or a wholesale distrust of form as such, a protest against the 
artificiality, isolation, and arbitrary character of all such exter-
nal organizing principles. The epistemological alternative of 
dualism or some form of mysticism and radical empiricism is 
but one instance of this dilemma between artificiality and isola-
tion or a radical distrust of form. Historically, the protean 
conflict between rationalism and empiricism portrays this same 
central dilemma. It confronts us just as surely in the major 
problems of ethics, of religion, and of social philosophy. In 
every region, this dilemma is inescapable and irresolvable so 
long as we are preoccupied solely with the way in which forms 
are used actively to organize some material. Is there any other 
relation between principles of organization and the material to 
which such principles are applied, the recognition of which 
can aid us in resolving· the dilemma f I believe that there is, and 
I think I know where at least to look for it. But before going 
in search of such a fresh relation, we must depict the main fea-
tures of any situation characterized solely by the application of 
organizing principles to an extraneous material. The following 
aspects present themselves : 
1. There is something given. It is the crude raw material 
for our enterprise. As it comes to us it is incomplete, unfinished; 
it supplies us merely with the occasion for doing· something 
with it or to it. It is a datum which we fit into some organized 
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domain. It is a bare stimulus to which we respond in some one 
of a variety of ways. It is a presenta.tion which becomes inter-
preted in the very act by which it is appropriated into our 
experience. It is material to be organized. 
2. There are alternative and competing modes of response 
to, aJJ.d interpretation of, that which is given. Were it other-
wise there would be no possibility of choice or of conflict among 
a variety of organized worlds such as we actually find. If the 
material of our experience carried along with it and demaJJ.ded 
the exclusive use of theoretical categ·ories, or of aesthetic forms, 
or of pra.ctical and utilitarian uses, or of a religious attitude on 
our part, then there would be no struggle on the part of these 
world-forming principles for an exclusive sovereignty over the 
same material. Or, if the given were tied down to a sing·le 
dominant metaphysical category, there would be no rivalry of 
metaphysical systems. If the material of human nature could 
not be utilized in the service of many different ideals, if the 
stuff of human desires and instincts carried along with it but a 
single plan of life, there would be no moral problem. Moreover, 
if in any of these instances, the given mass of material were 
inevitab\y tied down to some one specific form, if there were no 
looseness of structure as between form and matter, we would 
not be in a position to discriminate as sharply as we do organiz-
ing principles from the material subsumed under them. We 
would not be so acutely aware of the presence of various prin-
ciples competing for the same material. Throughout, one and 
the same mass of given stuff is confronted by alternative and 
competing forms. The same datum admits of varying interpre-
tation; it may elicit a variety of responses. The given is prob-
lematic just for this reason, that it does not bring with it one 
single, authentic form, to the exclusion of all other possibly 
competing forms. It is here, I think, where is to be found the 
metaphysical root of freedom. It springs from the confronta-
tion of stuff by alternative forms no one of which is predeter-
mined inexorably by the given matter. Moreover, this indeter-
minateness and looseness of structure with respect to matter 
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and form is that feature of things which is bound up with what 
we call consciousness. Consciousness spells the presence of 
alternative determinations, modes of response to a stimulus, 
possibilities. Both freedom and mind come into being· only when 
any material does not inevitahly carry with it the one form 
which organizes and determines it. 
3. The next feature to observe is crucial. Each specific 
active form, organizing whatever material is offered to it, builds 
a self-contained structure, an organized domain. Whatever 
comes within this domain is stamped with the same defining 
mark or category. · There is a plurality of such organized sover-
eign domains. The form which org·anizes the .stuff of one domain 
has no jurisdiction beyond the boundaries of its own realm. 
The many domains are impervious to one another. We are in a 
world of this; that, or the other 'concentric' situation, depicted 
by Mr. Loewenberg. Or, rather, we are, at any one time, within 
the confines of some one circumference depending upon the kind 
of defining relation-the type of priority-which at the moment 
we happen to select. Once you are within a circle you will 
discover no hint or leading which will carry ;YOU into the organ-
ized structure of any other circle. Each generating form builds 
up a substantive medium isolated from and impervious to all 
other organized systems. 
The account of the situation which I am here giving' is neces-
sarily quite abstract because I want it capable of covering many 
different concrete regions. It should be descriptive of the inde-
pendent autonomy and isolation in our modern ag·e of the 
worlds of science, art, religion, and practical economy. It must 
be pertinent to the strife of metaphysical categories which 
engender diverse theoretical structures. It must portray the 
competition of warring· moral ideals and ultimate preferences, 
each of which is responsible for its own specific judgments of 
value. Here are various strata in our experience. On each 
level there is a diversity of organizing principles, active forms. 
Each form generates its own world, its own concentric organiza-
.tion. The ensuing concentric predicaments, on whatever level 
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they occur,•find their prototype in the individualism and solip-
sism of the ego-centric predicament. E~ch organizing form is 
the source of an individual self-contained structure. The mate-
rial which is built into any one such structure is owned by it 
exclusively. Active forms thus conceived are principles of indi-
viduation and mutual isolation. Forms, regarded primarily as 
organizing principles, not only lead to organized domains and 
concentric predicaments which are insulated from one another. 
The ,situation as thus viewed entails the further consequence of 
isolating· all of the organized realms of experience and of knowl-
edge from ·cosmic material and stuff, existing in its own right and 
nature. How could it be otherwise? A.s soon as stuff comes 
within the range of any active form organizing a domain in 
accordance with its own defining_ principle, it ceases to be pure 
stuff. In being attended to and apprehended it becomes cate-
gorized, labeled, stamped by the form which appropriates it. 
Its own secret powers and qualities1 the natures and habits 
which characterize it in its own 'domain are hidden from us. 
On these premises we are justified in surmising that stuff, sub-
stance, things in themselves are not characterized by those rela-
tional qualities which belong to the organized material of our 
domains. Or, at the very least, it is a dogmatic assumption that 
such is the case, and this is the initial uncritical prejudice of 
rationalism. By what warrant can we allege tliat the types of 
order derived from the organizing principles of the several 
domains of experience, of discourse, of description, of scientific 
intelligibility, of value systems, also characterize substance which 
is not fetched within these domains? 
Kant's assertion of a chaotic manifold of sensibility which 
becomes ordered and related only in so far as it is subject to 
transcendental principles of synthesis has been often counter-
mined by an apparently simple reflection. Kant lugs in a 
transcendental principle of synthesis, a set of organizing forms, 
only because he shares with Hume the prejudice that experience 
as given comes in detached unrelated bits. He does not believe 
in the reality of relations. He overlooks the fact that relations 
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are given just as indubitably as are the rela.ta and qualia. between 
which they hold. Having assumed that the matter of experience 
is thus truncated and mutilated, he had of course no recourse 
save to invoke the synthetic organizing activity of forms and 
principles which are not given along with the matter of experi-
ence. His whole position is outflanked, as well as that of Hume's 
uncritical empiricism, once it is recogniz.ed that relations a.re 
experienced along with qualities and impressions. Now I think 
that this comment, repeatedly ma.de by J a.mes and Dewey, over-
looks the motive which actually led Kant, rightly or wrongly, 
to his conclusion. It is not that Kant was blind to the fact that 
we have an experience of 'and' and 'but' and 'of.' It was 
rather that Kant was primarily impressed by the existence of 
diverse organizing principles in experience each of which is 
responsible for its world, its own domain. Kant is the spokes-
. man for the autonomy of the several worlds of science, art, mor-
ality, which owe their existence to world-organizing, ,active 
forms. Something deeply characteristic of the whole temper of 
modern civilization finds articulate expression in this philosophy 
for the first time. Dissatisfaction with the given, the impulse 
to make it intelligible, significant, and human, to organize the 
given in accordance with principles and ideals which express the 
nature and demands of the human spirit, this prepossession and 
its implied consequences outweigh for him every other consid-
eration. If it be asked, then, why Kant was so stupid as not to 
see that experience does not come in unrelated and isolated bits, 
the answer. is in terms of. the exigencies of his initial insight, his 
faithfulness to the temper of the modern world. .And if our 
experience be seen as the effective operation of dominant organ-
izing interests and categories, the material thus organized must 
be different from the material which falls outside the scope of 
our organized domains. Once you accept a framework of active 
forms organizing a given material, you appear committed to the 
view that the domains thus organized are not only isolated from 
one another, generating the various concentric predicaments ; 
they also appear to be cut off from the cosmic source of the stuff 
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which we know and experience only as categorized and organ-
ized. With one such seemingly self-contained realm, that of 
discourse, I have dealt in another paper.2 I did not see then as 
clearly as I think I do now, what the primary philosophical 
motive is which leads one to the belief in an isolated area of 
discourse, to an insistence upon_ the discrepancy between all the 
terms of description within discourse and the object to which 
the d~scription is intended to apply but which it never reaches 
because the object does not fall within the domain of description. 
That' motive I believe to be just this tacit dependence upon the 
categories of organizing active forms assimilating and working 
upon a given material. Unless this framework undergoes some 
further modification, unless it is supplemented by something 
else, there is no way of overcoming either the isolation of the 
organized structures of experience from one another, or their 
isolation from substance and things in themselves. Yet it is 
this framework which appears to be omnipresent and inescap-
able; it is spread across the pages of modern philosophical 
reflection in protean shapes. I say 'modern,' because the tem-
per and character of ancient and medieval life and, thought 
were precisely such as not to evoke this philosophical frame-
work. In the very stuff' of the world as given, it was supposed 
that there could be discerned objective forms, relational struc-
tures, and ordered schemata. The habitat of man was an organ-
ized hierarchy of structures. Categories were as objective as 
stuff. The material which the world offered to man's powers 
of apprehension carried with it its own forms. The settled, 
feudal, and authoritative hierarchy of forms was there, awaiting 
discernment and acknowledgment. .Acquiescence in the given 
because the given when truly discerned was seen to be stable, 
ordered, and significant, because stuff implied the presence of 
inevitable and authoritative forms, this expre~ses the deepest 
assumption of the temper of classical philosophy. We may go 
on and say, if we like, that this philosophy itself expressed the 
2 '' Truth, Discourse, and Reality,'' University of California Publiaations 
im Philosophy, X: 177-205. 
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temper of a settled, authoritative, and feudal civilization. Who 
can call in question the dissolution of this temper of life and 
thought through the centuries which separate us from the middle 
ages f When I try to compress into a single formula what it 
all means, barren and abstract as any formula must be, this is 
what I have to say. The given has become for us material to 
be, exploited, to be organized, to be transmuted into shapes, 
compacted into domains in accordance not with what we find, 
but in agreement with what we want. Forms have been pried 
loose from objective stuff. We have learned that the same mate-
rial can be exploited by different and competing organizing 
principles. For the physics of Aristotle, nature is constituted 
of the very same qualities which we find in immediate sense 
experience, qualities in which objective forms· fixedly inhere. 
For modern physics beginning with Galileo, the qualities which 
things wear are transmuted into expressions of quantitative and 
mathematical relations which are neither given nor observed. 
They are constructed by the operation of deductive reasoning. 
This at least is the ideal to which modern clas~ical physics 
appeared to be committed, an ideal which becomes explicit in the 
work of Newton, Kant, and Laplace. But when the forms and 
organizing principles of the physical order are seen not to be 
given along with the qualitative matter of sense experience, they 
become tinged with a character of conventiality and artificiality. 
The same problematic situation confronts us elsewhere. It is 
depicted, for instance, in the analysis of the moral problem and 
dilemma to which Royce devoted the first half of his Religio1ts 
Aspect of Philosophy. The organizing principles of conduct 
, and practical life he there speaks of as ideals. There are con-
flicting principles. There is the warfare of moral ideals, Dif-
ferent forms compete for mastery of the same material. What 
decides in favor of some ideal as against its competitors f Where 
do dominant ideals and organizing principles come from f If 
you say that a valid ideal can only be fetched from what exists, 
you obliterate the distinction between the ideal and the real. 
You make every ou,ght conform to an is. You are an ethical 
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realist. · Conservative conformity to things as they are is the 
result. If on the other hand, you rebel against the real and the 
given, if you commit yourself to an ideal which is not deposited 
by a given situation, there will be nothing to guide you save 
your own caprice. Either conformity to the real, or the arbi-
trary and lmgrounded choice of some one principle of organiza-
tion. Whichever ideal you choose, you build up a world which 
is isolated from every domain which is organized according to a 
different plan or form. And all the organized ethically signifi-
cant worlds have no communication with and receive no guidance 
from the discovered and the given, the real or the objective. 
Either conventionality, artifice, and isolation, or no- significant 
and ordered world at all. This is the alternative and the dilemma 
imposed upon trn by a framework of thought and life in which 
diverse active forms compete for the right to exploit and organize 
a mass of given material. 
I am convinced that it is just this dilemma which is the 
central theme in the philosophy of Hume. Nothing is given in 
experience save discrete and unrelated impressions. Every 
element of order and organization in the world is an adventitious 
and illegitimate intrusion, imputed to the world through 'cus-
tom and imagination,' through practical necessity and animal 
faith. It is no part of the given. Yet there is no theoretical 
justification for any organized structures which exhibit a dis-
crepancy from the given. The world of common sense and of 
organized knowledge, the world in which there are leadings and 
linkages, substance and causality, is authorized neither by 
experience nor by reason. Every principle of organization and 
source of order is arbitrary and irrational, nor is it justified by 
any hint conveyed to us by what we find. The organized struc-
tures of experience are artificial. The unorganized stuff of 
impressions is useless for knowledge or for practice. Where will 
one find a more adequate formulation of the dilemma which 
issues from the organizi_ng principle of modern life and thought 1 
It is clear that we cannot leave the matter thus, and it is 
possible to indicate the sort of relation between form and matter, 
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whose discovery would ease the tension which we have been 
depicting. It would be that relation in which the organizing· 
principle which orders any material at the same time expresses 
the nature of the stuff which it organizes. Can we hope to find 
any such relation as this 1 I think that we may. I shall at this 
time do. no more than cite, all too briefly, certain situations in 
which forms stand to material both in the relation of expressing 
i~s nature and of organizing it. And because any material 
which gets itself concentrated and expressed in a form is a pro-
cess rather than any static stuff, I shall speak of the relation 
between form and process. 
A purpose is an active form of experience as practical. A 
purpose is a plan of action which organizes and guides directly 
a process of behavior and indirectly the objective situation of 
our environment. It exemplifies a dominant scheme of practice 
and of conduct. When sufficiently comprehensive, a purpose 
shades off into an ideal. It incorporates a judgment of value 
and it claims the right of organizing a course of conduct. 
Where do purposes, plans of actions, ideals, judgments of value 
and standards come from? The role which they play in organ-
izing the material of human nature, in controlling the processes 
of life and behavior suggests an origin in some region trans-
cendent to the processes which they organize. How otherwise 
could forms be active principles of organization~ Ethical dual-
ism and idealism, the divorce between the ideal and the real, 
between the ought and the is, between form and process, appears 
as the inevitable transcription of our experience as practical and 
as active. This motive receives its classical formulation in the 
ethics of Kant. But, on the other hand, if any ideal in truth 
derives from a source alien to and transcendent to the processes 
and vital interests which it is to organize, what is to insure any 
measure of relevancy, or any rightful claim on the part of such 
external forms to intrude into and dominate the processes of 
life and behavior? The stuff which is organized by purposes 
and ideals is not inert, passive material with no momentum or 
energy of its own. It is comprised of interests, desires, impulses, 
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conations ; not matter but process is the proper counterpart of 
those forms with which ethics is concerned. A form or ideal 
which does not express the nature and life of such processes is 
both unable, as a matter of fa.ct, to. obtain any control over 
them, nor has it any right to claim such control. But this is not 
to say that every ideal or form is a sheer prolongation or echo, 
an abstract transcript of the process which it expresses. A pur-
pose .or ideal which expresses a vital interest thereby modifies, 
enriches, and transforms that interest. Forms are not epiphe-
nomena or shadows, ·or thin cross-sections of processes. Nor are 
they adventitious intrusions into processes from some trans-
cendent world. They stand to processes in the relation both of 
expressing their nature and of organizing them. This supplies 
me with the one significant clew to an understanding of the 
central issues of theoretical ethics. 
A second region which provides a:ri illustration. of a form 
which organizes the very processes which it expresses is that of 
language symbols. To say that words are symbols of things or 
substitutes for them is not adequate. A significant word is a 
concentration, an expression, a form of our response to a thing. 
A word summarizes a process of behavior, to speak in behavior-
istic terms, or it summarizes and expresses a train of thought. 
As Stout puts it, '' what they, i.e., words, fix and detain is not 
a sensible presentation, as such, but an apperceptive system.' '3 
Words are, he says primarily expressive signs. They are expres-
sions of thought processes. They are forms which summarize 
and concentrate in themselves moving and living processes, 
whether of behavior or of thought. But at the same time a 
language symbol is not merely the passive deposit of some ante-
cedent process. It is also the instrument whereby that process 
is itself clarified, organized, and literally rendered articulate, 
i.e., appearing as a jointed, relational structure. The common 
experience of discovering what one wants to say only through 
the act of uttering in language symbols some· as yet inarticulate 
and relatively unorganized idea provides a capital instance of 
a Stout, G. F., Analytical Psychology, II:192. 
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the double relation in which forms may stand to processes. A 
process finds utterance in a form. Form is demanded by pro-
cess. Yet form, in expressing a process, also reacts back upon 
the process, deflecting and organizing it, eliciting from it a 
greater wealth of content and meaning than seemed to be pres-
ent before form made its appearance. 
I should wish also to view the central problem of the cate-
gories in the light of this situation. .A category is an organizing 
, principle used to interpret the given. Whence are categories 
derived? .Are we limited to one of the two, alternatives, either 
that categories have their source in some mind or self or prin-
ciple of synthesis utterly discontinU<ms with the given, or that 
they are imbedded within the given, awaiting abstraction? I do 
not think that we are. Each of these alternatives leads to insup-
erable difficulties. Were categories really extraneous to the 
material to which they purport to apply, their application, if 
successful, would be a sheer miracle. Nor would they yield any 
comprehension or interpretation of the given. The continuity 
between the given and the forms which interpret it and render it 
intelligible cannot be completely broken. On t?-e other hand, 
categories complete the given; they have a sweep and spread 
vastly greater than that of any given. They are the sources of 
ideal constructions. They do organize the given and are not 
merely lifted out of given material. This can only be described, 
so far as I can see, by saying that categories both express the 
nature of the given and, also, organize, complete, and enrich 
the given. Given, are, indeed, processes which express them-
selves in forms, and these in turn organize the processes whence 
they have sprung. 
It is the richness and complexity of process which is respon-
sible for the generation of so many forms. Their competition, 
their diversity, expresses the vitality of process. No one form 
in which process expresses itself is or can be adequate to the 
whole nature and life of process. Hence the discrepancy and 
tension between form and process, between continuity and dis-
creteness, a tension which is exemplified in every region of the 
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world's processes open to our inspection. Physical processes 
engender and express their nature in physical things which in 
turn deflect the processes which have generated them. Each 
thing, each center of organization, is limited and partial; it 
becomes replaced by another thing. It is the same for living 
structures and forms with respect to life processes, and it is not 
otherwise with historical st~uctures and institutions in relation 
to the processes of history . 
.And experience itself, occurring as it does only in what we 
call selves, is to be viewed not as any self-enclosed substantive 
domain, generating our concentric dilemmas, our closed circles 
isolated from each other and from the objective medium which 
envelops them. Experience itself is the expression and concentra-
tion of processes, physical, biological, historical, and social ; only 
because it is thus continuous with processes which stretch out in 
various directions and dimensions, does it hold the power and 
the right to· interpret and to organize,. to master both theoreti-
cally and practically the very processes of nature and life of 
which it is an expression. Experience is not an island whose 
shore-line separates it from the surrounding ocean of reality; 
it is no self-enclosed domain. It is rather the focal point of a 
perspective in which the nature and life of processes which 
stretch outward in ever widening reaches find both expression 
and interpretation. 
